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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
THE HADDOCK CASE OVERRULED-THE FUTURE
OF INTERSTATE DIVORCE.
By JOHN S. STRAHORN, JR.,* and
G. KENNETH REIBLICH**
In Williams and Hendrix v. North Carolina," the opinion
in which was handed down on December 21, 1942, the
Supreme Court of the United States overruled the famous
case of Haddock v. Haddock' and thereby took an important
step toward clarifying the problem of when divorces
granted by an American state are entitled to full faith
and credit in other American states. As a result of the
recent decision, a larger number of (although still not
all) divorces granted by sister states must now be given
recognition by all American states. Furthermore, the case
suggests important problems still needful of future solu-
tion in the field of interstate divorce.'
I.
THE HOLDING IN THE WILLIAMS AND HENDRIX CASE
In the principal case, Mr. Williams, the first named
appellant, had lived in North Carolina for twenty-four
years with his first wife. Mrs. Hendrix, the other appel-
* A.B., 1922, St. John's College; LL.B., 1925, Washington and Lee Uni-
versity; S.J.D., 1926, Harvard Law School; J.S.D., 1931, Yale Law School.
Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Faculty Editor
of the REviEw.
** A.B., 1925, Ph.D., 1928, Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1929, New
York University; LL.M., 1937, Columbia University. Professor of Law,
University of Maryland School of Law. Assistant Editor of the REvIEw.
'63 S. Ct. 207 (U. S. 1942) ; Baltimore Daily Record, January 15, 1943.
2201 U. S. 562 (1906). For previous comment on the problem of the
Haddock case by one of the present writers, see Strahorn, A Rationale of
the Haddock Case (1938) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 796-815; and Strahorn, The
supreme Court Revisits Haddock (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 412-423.
3The phrase "interstate divorce" subsumes three separate problems:
(A) when must a sister state, as a matter of full faith and credit under
the tinited States Constitution, grant recognition to a divorce granted by
another American state; (B) when may a sister state voluntarily grant
comity to a divorce granted by another American state, without being
reversed by the Supreme Court under due process of law, and what are
and should be the local state rules determining when such comity will be
exercised; and (C) when may, will, or should an American state grant a
divorce in a case having contacts with other states than itself.
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lant, had lived in North Carolina for twenty years with
her first husband. In May of 1940 they left their first
spouses and departed for Nevada where, after complying
with the Nevada requirement of six weeks' residence, each
sued for and was granted a divorce from his or her spouse,
without either of the respective divorce case defendants
either entering an appearance4 or being personally served
in Nevada, although actual notice reached both defendants
of the pendency of the cases.5
Shortly after being granted the respective divorces, and
while still in Nevada, the appellants married each other.
They then returned to North Carolina, where they set up
housekeeping as husband and wife. They were later in-
dicted in North Carolina for "bigamous cohabitation" (not
bigamy) ,6 were convicted, and the conviction was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.7  The Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari' and then
reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of
the Court, concurred in by Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Jus-
tices Roberts, Black, and Reed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
filed a concurring opinion. There were dissents by Jus-
tices Murphy and Jackson, the former by brief opinion, the
latter by extended onef
'See 63 S. Ct. 207, 209, n. 2, to the effect that Mrs. Hendrix's husband
had agreed to appear, but never did enter a formal appearance, and the
trial court herein charged that this was not equivalent to an actual ap-
pearance.
' See 63 S. Ct. 207, 209, to the effect that notice was given Hendrix
through newspaper advertisement and mail to his last address which, as is
obvious from the preceding footnote herein, must have reached him. Mrs.
Williams was served with a copy of the summons and complaint in North
Carolina by a North Carolina sheriff.
6 North Carolina could not have prosecuted for bigamy, as that crime
may be prosecuted only in the jurisdiction where the bigamous ceremony
is performed. Rather the prosecution was under N. C. Code (1939) Sec.
4342 which punished cohabitation in North Carolina under a bigamous
marriage performed elsewhere. Maryland has no such statutory crime
of bigamous cohabitation; although the same r sult might be reached by
prosecuting for the statutory crime of adultery, Md. Code (1939) Art. 27,
Sec. 5; or for the common law crime of open and notorious illicit co-
habitation, on which see CLARK AND MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES (4th ed.
1940) Sec. 465.
7 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. 1R. (2d) 769 (1941).
8 315 U. S. 795 (1942).
'At the time of the argument and decision there was one vacancy on
the Court, inasmuch as a successor to Mr. Justice Byrnes had not yet been
appointed. The vote in the case was thus 6--2.
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At the trial the State pressed its case for conviction,
on a claim of the invalidity in North Carolina of the Nevada
divorces, on two alternative bases: (1) that even if the
plaintiffs in the Nevada cases had acquired valid Nevada
domiciles, yet for lack of either personal service on de-
fendants in Nevada or their entering appearances in the
Nevada litigation, those divorces were not entitled to recog-
nition in North Carolina; and (2) that the respective
Nevada plaintiffs had never acquired valid Nevada domi-
ciles anyhow. The trial court charged on both points, °
and the jury rendered a general verdict of guilty, judg-
ment on which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the
State, although its opinion principally stressed the law con-
cerning point (1), as to whether another state can refuse
recognition to a sister state divorce granted at plaintiff's
bona fide separate domicil. The North Carolina court
relied on the Haddock case in affirming.".
On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States,
North Carolina apparently conceded sufficient evidence
in the record to establish the plaintiffs' domiciles in Ne-
vada, and did not seek affirmance for lack thereof, 2 but,
rather, chose to rely on the Haddock case as establishing
a right to deny recognition to the single domicil divorces
of Nevada. The opinion of the Supreme Court accepted
that as the proper basis of determination, and proceeded
to dispose of the case as if both the Nevada plaintiffs had
10 63 S. Ct. 207, 209: "The State contended that since neither of the
defendants in the Nevada actions was served in Nevada nor entered an
appearance there, the Nevada decrees would not be recognized as valid in
North Carolina. On this issue the court charged the jury in substance
that a Nevada divorce decree based on substituted service where the de-
fendant made no appearance would not be recognized in North Carolina
under the rule of Pridgen v. Pridgen, 203 N. C. 533, 166 S. E. 591. The
State further contended that petitioners went to Nevada not to establish
Vi bona fide residence but solely for the purpose of taking advantage of the
laws of that state to obtain a divorce through fraud upon that court. On
that issue the court charged the jury that under the rule of State v.
Herron, 175 N. C. 754, 94 S. E. 698, the defendants had the burden of satis-
fying the jury, but not beyond a reasonable doubt, of the bona fides of
their residence in Nevada for the required time."21 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. E. (2d) 769, 778 (1941).
1263 S. Ct. 207, 209-10: "But there are two reasons why we do not reach
that issue in this case. In the first place, North Carolina does not seek to
sustain the judgment below on that ground. Moreover it admits that there
probably is enough evidence in the record to require that petitioners be
considered 'to have been actually domiciled in Nevada.'"
1942)
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acquired valid Nevada domiciles.1 The Court fortified
this approach by calling attention to the fact that the rule
of the Stromberg case 4 required them to reverse if either
of the alternative grounds for the conviction's propriety
was unconstitutional. For this reason, also, the Court had
the opportunity (or created it) to face squarely the issue
of whether to perpetuate the Haddock case rule as to when
separate domicil divorces are entitled to full faith and
credit.
It is clear that the effect of the majority opinion speci-
fically overruling 15 the Haddock case is now to entitle
more sister state divorces than formerly to full faith and
credit (compulsory recognition) by all other American
states. But it should be made equally clear (erroneous
newspaper comment to the contrary)' 6 that the principal
case does not entitle all sister state divorces to full faith
and credit. In order to understand the implications of
the overruling of the Haddock case, it is necessary to state
the Supreme Court law of American interstate divorce as
it previously stood.
18 63 S. Ct. 207, 210: "However it might be resolved in another proceed-
ing, we cannot evade the constitutional issue in this case on the easy
assumption that petitioners' domicil in Nevada was a sham and a fraud.
Rather we must treat the present case for the purpose of the limited issue
before us precisely the same as if petitioners had resided in Nevada for a
term of years and had long ago acquired a permanent abode there. In
other words, we would reach the question whether North Carolina could
refuse to recognize the Nevada decrees because in its view and contrary to
the findings of the Nevada court petitioners had no actual, bona fide
domicil in Nevada, if and only if we concluded that Haddock v. Haddock
was correctly decided. But we do not think it was."
14 Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931).
15 63 S. Ct. 207, 216: "Haddock v. Haddock is overruled."
16 The press dispatches on the day the opinion was handed down all
gave to understand that the Supreme Court was compelling full faith and
credit for all sister state divorces, regardless of domicil. Time Magazine
for January 4, 1943 devoted half a column to the same thesis under the
heading: "Divorce Wins a Verdict." A syndicated columnist in a Wash-
ington newspaper achieved the remarkable juridical feat of ascribing that
effect to the Court's opinion from the fact that the majority opinion did not
dispute Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting statement that the case substituted
the law of Nevada for the divorce law of all other states. The Baltimore
Daily Record, January 4, 1943, carried a more cautious article with a
Washington date-line which was written after sober reflection of the
actual impact of the case, and ended with the statement: ". . . persons
who go to other states to obtain divorces, perhaps collusively and with no
intention of establishing a domicile there, had best not place too much con-
fidence in Williams, et al., v. State of North Carolina."
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II.
THE PREvIous STATE OF THE LAW
Prior to the principal case, divorces granted in a state
where neither spouse had a bona fide domicil were not
entitled to full faith and credit in other states (nor even
local validity nor voluntary foreign recognition by
comity).17 Thus, as was done in the Maryland Walker
case,'8 other states could allow collateral attack on the
jurisdictional fact of domicile. To be sure, the use of
the doctrines of estoppel and res adjudicata, later to be
dealt with more extensively herein,19 caused certain color-
able domicil divorces to be given effect they were not
otherwise entitled to.
Then, too, prior to the principal case, it was most clear
that if both spouses were domiciled in the granting state,
other states had to give the divorce full faith and credit
whether they wished to or not, whatsoever their own pol-
icies about divorce. This followed from a part of the
Haddock case not now repudiated, as well as from other
authority.20
The real prior difficulty concerned divorces granted
where one, but not both, of the spouses had a valid domicil
in the granting state. In this area the Haddock case struck
a compromise, now repudiated by the principal case. Prior
to the recent case the following enumerated kinds of sepa-
rate domicil divorces had to be given full faith and credit:
1" See text, infra, circa n. 84, et seq. for speculation concerning the pos-
sible ultimate recognition that may yet be given to the local validity (per-
haps comity recognition elsewhere) of divorces granted on the basis of
residence without domicil. The due process invalidity of no-domicil di-
vorces, even for local purposes, has long been taken for granted and can
be said to rest on the following quotation from a part of the Haddock case
not repudiated in the principal case: ". . . as distinguished from legal
domicil, mere residence within a particular state of the plaintiff in a
divorce cause brought in a court of such state is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon such court to dissolve the marriage relation existing be-
tween the plaintiff and a non-resident defendant." Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U. S. 562, 583 (1906). Supporting language is found in Bell v. Bell,
181 U. S. 175, 177 (1901) ; and Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179, 183
(1901).
18 Walker v. Walker, 125 Md. 649, 94 A. 346 (1915).
19 Infra, circa n. 97 et seq.
20 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 570 (1906) ; Cheever v. Wilson, 9
Wall. 108 (U. S. 1869) ; and Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901).
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(1) where the defendant was the one domiciled in the
granting state; (2) where the plaintiff was there domiciled,
and the state was the "last marital domicil" of the spouses;"'
(3) where the plaintiff was there domiciled, and the de-
fendant was personally served with process within the
granting state; and (4) where the plaintiff was there domi-
ciled, and the defendant entered an appearance in the
case. The further contention was made by Professor
Beale2 and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws that
two additional factors should also compel the recognition
of separate domicil divorces, i. e., defendant's having con-
sented to plaintiff's having a separate home; and defend-
ant's misconduct justifying such a separate home. The
Davis case,24 decided by the Supreme Court four years
before the principal one, hinted at the recognition of the
Beale-Restatement factors as compelling the recognition
of more (not all) separate domicil divorces. Beyond these,
the remaining group of divorces obtained by domiciled
plaintiffs against non-domiciled defendants were locally
valid where rendered and could be granted comity in other
states, but the other states were not required to grant
full faith and credit to them, against their wishes.
III.
THE EFFECT OF THE WILLIAMS AND HENDRIX CASE
What the principal case has done, and all that it has
done, is to reject the latter idea and entitle such last-named
separate domicil divorces also to the same full faith and
credit that the four classes enumerated above formerly
received under the Haddock case. The North Carolina
21Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901) had, prior to the Haddock
case, compelled full faith and credit for single domicil divorces if the
granting state was the "last marital domicil" of the spouses, i. e., if the
defendant had lived there with the plaintiff prior to the separation and
defendant's change of domicil.
"Beale, Haddock Revi8ited (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417; and BEALE,
TREATISE OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) Secs. 113.9, 113.10, 113.11.
238 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) Sec. 113.
"Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938); commented on by one of the
present writers, with reference to the Beale-Restatement factors, in Stra-
horn, The Supreme Court Revits Haddock (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 412,
416-17.
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Court, in affirming the conviction principally on that
point,25 was merely following the then extant option
granted other States of voluntarily choosing whether to
recognize the residual separate domicil divorces. The
Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing on that
point alone, has squarely repudiated the Haddock option
in favor of the new rule that all separate domicil divorces,
not merely some, shall receive the same treatment, that
of compulsory recognition under the full faith and credit
clause. No longer will one and the same single domicil
divorce be valid where granted and possibly in a few
other states, and yet invalid in the rest, because of differing
factors involved in connection with the other states' exer-
cising the Haddock option.
It is still open, however, to other states to re-investi-
gate the validity of the domicil in the granting state relied
on as the basis for jurisdiction. The principal case makes
that clear by its emphasis on the point that there was no
need to "meet the issue" of the Bell case,26 which allowed
other states to re-open the question of jurisdictional domicil
and to reject the divorce if neither spouse was domiciled
there. The Walker case,2" the only clear cut Maryland
Court of Appeals case on foreign divorce, did merely that.
It rejected a Nevada divorce upon our own finding that
neither spouse was domiciled there.
For that matter, depending on North Carolina criminal
procedure, the appellants in the principal case may yet
be tried again for bigamous cohabitation on the sole re-
maining basis of their never having acquired valid Nevada
domiciles, and a jury conviction may well stand up, unless
the Bell case is, later, itself to be overruled. It must be
remembered that, in the principal case, the Supreme Court
merely reversed for error in one of the two possible alter-
25 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. E. (2d) 769 (1941).
26 Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901), wherein the Court had ruled that
other states did not have to give full faith and credit to a divorce granted
on substituted service where neither spouse had a valid domicil in the
granting state. Equally important is Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14
(1903), where the Court also held that full faith and credit did not have to
be given where there was domicil of neither, even if the defendant entered
an appearance in the divorce case.
27Walker v. Walker, 125 Md. 649, 94 A. 346 (1915).
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native grounds for the conviction. A new trial under
the remaining ground would seem proper."
The beneficent effect of the overthrow of the Haddock
case will be a simplification of issues in the field of inter-
state divorce. In the normal case, the issues will be simply
two: (1) was there valid domicil of at least one party
in the granting state; (2) was procedural due process satis-
fied, or, as usually presented under this point, was there
adequate notice?
There will be eliminated from significance such con-
fusing factors, once important under the Haddock case,
as whether one or both were domiciled in the granting
state, who was at fault in the separation, "last marital
domicil," personal service within the granting state,29 what
constitutes an appearance and whether one was entered,30
whether and under what circumstances to grant comity,31
and, to a large extent, the theoretical problem, is divorce
in rem or in personamY2
In the Maryland scene there will never have to be
answered the as yet unsolved question, shall we grant
comity (and, if so, under what circumstances) to those
separate domicil divorces not entitled to anything more
than comity under the Haddock case? 33 There can be for-
gotten the confusing law of certain other states (par-
"' There would be no double jeopardy objection to this, as there is no
such objection to any re-trial of a criminal case after a reversal sought
by the defendant for error in the conduct of the first trial, so long as a
conviction is plausible on a re-trial with the erroneous part deleted.
29 As indicated in the text, infra, circa ns. 105-107, the fact of the de-
fendant's appearance may again assume importance in the (problematical)
event that the Court shall ever extend the doctrine of res judicata as to
domicil to cover mere personal jurisdiction, even without contest of the
issue of domicil.
"Ibid, as to appearance.
11 Likewise, comity may yet again resume importance, and the problem
of whether and when to grant it may return if, as suggested in the text,
infra, circa n. 84, et seq., the Court ever decides in favor of local validity
and voluntary recognition for residence divorces, or if, as suggested in the
text, infra, circa n. 94, et seq., the Court ever decides in favor of less
extensive recognition of sister state divorces for some purposes than for
others.
82 See the mention of the in rem or in personam problem In the opinions
in the principal case, 63 S. Ct. 207, 212-13, 221-2.
38 While the Maryland Court had never had occasion to rule specifically
on whether it would grant comity under the Haddock option, and under
what circumstances, yet it was probable that it would have allowed comity.
See REsTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws, MARYLAND ANNOTATIoNs (1937)
See. 113.
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ticularly in New York) as to when that comity should be
exercised. 4 We and other states must now undergo the
compulsion of granting full faith and credit to all those
divorces formerly entitled at best to comity, and the sepa-
rate class of divorces entitled to comity but not full faith
and credit vanishes.
We shall be spared further speculation as to whether
Professor Beale"5 and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws0
were right in their contentions that the Haddock case
impliedly stood for two further factors as compelling full
faith and credit beyond the three it specifically recog-
nized." To be sure, the Beale-Restatement views, as indi-
cated in the majority opinion in the principal case,8 may
be significant under local law in states which still choose
to make those factors jurisdictional for the granting of
divorces in their courts.3 9
14Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 27, 13 P. (2d) 719, 86 A. L. R. 1321
(1932), noted 21 Calif. L. Rev. 504 (1933) ; Dean v. Dean, 241 N. Y. 240,
143 N. E. 844, 42 A. L. R. 1398 (1925) ; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N. Y. 296, 12
N. E. (2d) 305 (1938) ; (see generally for the New York problem Greene,
The Enforcement of a Foreign Divorce Decree in New York (1926) 11
Corn. L. Q. 141) ; Hellmuth v. Hellmuth, 98 F. (2d) 431 (D. C. C. A. 1938)
cert. den. 305 U. S. 597 (1938) ; Kraskin v. Kraskin, 104 F. (2d) 218 (D. C.
C. A. 1939) ; cert. den. 308 U. S. 568 (1939). Some states avoided this
problem by calling for voluntary recognition of all procedurally valid single
domicil divorces, as in Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 92 A. 684,
Ann. Cas. 1916B, 920 (1914). Of course, the problem may remain as to
foreign divorces as distinguished from those of sister states. Cf. Gould v.
Gould, 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1925).
5 Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417; and BEALE,
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) Secs. 113.9, 113.10, 113.11.
'a RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) Sec. 113.
87 Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938) may or may not have recognized
the Beale-Restatement factors as compelling full faith and credit, but that
question is now moot, inasmuch as the principal case compels full faith and
credit for cases coming under them, and beyond them. For treatment of
the Beale-Restatement factors, see Strahorn, A Rationale of the Haddock
Case (1938) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 706, 801-808; and Strahorn, The Supreme Court
Revisits Haddock (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 412, 416-417.
8 63 S. Ct. 207, 214.
"At this time there will be set out a brief survey of the Maryland law
as to when the Maryland courts will entertain divorce suits when there
are interstate complications. Under Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 38, as
amended (on another point, concerning notice, treated herein, infra, circa
n. 66, et seq.) Md. Laws 1941, C. 516, residence either of plaintiff or of
defendant is sufficient to confer jurisdiction, and the suit may be filed in
the county either where the plaintiff or the defendant resides.
If the residence in the State is of sufficient duration, no particular period
of residence in the given county Is required. For other grounds than in-
sanity, if the ground occur in Maryland, no particular period of residence
in the state is required, and only bona fide domicil is requisite, and it
makes no difference that both the spouses were non-residents when the
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IV.
RELATION TO OTHER RECENT REVERSALS OF DOCTRINE
One could well analogize this important reversal by
the recently re-constituted Supreme Court to two other
equally epochal recent reversals, viz., the overthrow of
Swift v. Tyson,40 in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins;4 and the
overthrow of inter-governmental tax immunity by the
Graves case 42 All three have in common that they make
for certainty of equal determination of the consequences
ground occurred in Maryland, so long as one of them becomes a resident
(however briefly) after the ground occurred in Maryland, Adams v. Adams,
101 Md. 506, 61 A. 628 (1905). For other grounds than insanity, if the
ground occur outside of Maryland, wheresoever the spouses lived at the
time, residence for one year prior to filing suit on the part of at least one
spouse is required, Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, See. 43, as amended Md. Laws
1941, Ch. 90. If the ground be insanity, a special requirement of two years
residence on the part of one of the spouses prior to filing suit is required
under Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, See. 41A, as added Md. Laws 1941, Ch. 497,
wheresoever the insanity occurred.
The word "residence" in the Maryland divorce Jurisdiction statutes has
been interpreted to mean domicil, so that In effect the requirement of a
certain duration of residence is superadded to the basic requirement of
domicil to obviate pretense of domicil in order to take advantage of our
divorce laws in situations where that Is thought likely. Harrison v. Har-
rison, 117 Md. 607, 84 A. 57 (1912) applied the requirement of domicil
with reference to the inter-County problem; and Willingham v. Willing-
ham, 162 Md. 539, 160 A. 280 (1932) found that the plaintiff had not accom-
plished a change of domieil from the District of Columbia to Maryland.
For prior treatment of the problem of domicil in the REviEw, with refer-
ence to other than divorce problems, see (1939) 4 Md. L. Rev. 98; and
(1941) 5 Md. L. Rev. 218.
Under Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 39, residence on a Federal reserva-
tion in a Maryland county is regarded as residence In the county for
divorce purposes. This statute changed the contrary rule of Lowe v. Lowe,
150 Md. 592, 133 A- 729 (1926).
The above rules apply to both a vinculo and a mensa divorce. On the
other hand, the separate procedure for alimony without divorce (obtain-
able on the ground for either type of divorce), has different jurisdictional
detail. Under Keerl v. Keerl, 34 Md. 21 (1871), domicil of at least one
of the spouses is requisite, and the mere presence of the husband's prop-
erty, without such domicil, is insufficient. If the defendant is amenable
to personal service therein, the suit must be brought in the Maryland
county where he resides or has his principal place of business, under Wood-
cock v. Woodcock, 169 Md. 40, 179 A. 826 (1935), noted (1936) 1 Md. L.
Rev. 81; and Scarborough v. Scarborough, 170 Md. 222, 183 A. 558 (1936).
Personal service must be had on the defendant husband in such a proceed-
ing, unless his local property is attached, although, for both types of
divorce, non-residents or residents against whom two non ests are returned
may be proceeded against by substituted service discussed herein infra,
circa n. 66, et seq.
40 Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
1 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
42 Graves v. People of State of New York, ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466
(1939), noted (1939) 4 Md. L. Rev. 77.
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of the same or exactly similar factual situations. Under
the principal case, divorces are equally good or bad43 every-
where. Under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, litigation about
a single situation will be determined by the same case-law
rules whether brought in State or Federal court. Under
the Graves case, a public jobholder and a private employee
who draw the same nominal salary will have the same
private economy, because now they have exactly the same
"income after taxes", which was not so in the days of
inter-governmental tax immunity. All of this is well.
It is also interesting to note that there is a further
similarity between the principal case and the Tompkins
case in that in both of them the Court went out of its way
to accomplish what it did." In the Tompkins case the
Court overthrew Swift v. Tyson of its own motion, without
the point having been argued by either side. In the prin-
cipal case, the majority opinion took great pains to set
the case up as a Haddock problem when, as Mr. Justice
Jackson argued, they could have disposed of it by affirming
on the basis of no valid domicil at all in Nevada. For that
matter, all three cases also have in common that they deal
with the clarification of legal doctrine as to the appropriate
inter-relation of parts of the Federal system.
V.
THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
A word might be said of the concurring and dissenting
opinions. On the strict legal argument for the recognition
of single-domicil divorces, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion adds nothing but the weight of its agree-
ment. His discussion emphasizes that inter-province or
interstate divorce difficulties in Canada and Australia have
been treated through centralized and uniform legislation;45
4 'At least, as far as the decision in the instant case is concerned. See
the text discussion infra, circa n. 84, et seq.; and circa n. 94, et seq., as to
the possible future recognition of new "lags" between local validity and
comity on the one hand and full faith and credit on the other.
" To the effect that the Court also went out of its way in order to attack
the Haddock problem in Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938), see Straborn,
The Supremze Court Revisits Haddock (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 412, 420, n. 61.
'1 67 S. Ct. 207, 216. For more detailed discussion see the articles of
Cook and Ross, cited herein infra, n. 121.
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but, that in the United States, with power reserved by the
Constitution to the States to deal with such matters, com-
plications must continue, unless national uniformity is ac-
complished through constitutionl amendment. Difficult
and tempting as the solution of the complications might
be, it is beyond the province of the Court to attempt it.
It is hinted that Congress might exercise some power under
the full-faith-and-credit clause to meet the special prob-
lems raised by divorce decrees.46 But until then, the sole
province of the Court lies in the duty imposed by the full
faith and credit clause to enforce recognition of divorces
valid where rendered, including removal of the compli-
cating factors incorrectly added by the Haddock decision.
His opinion seems to be a learned way of going beyond
the judicial function of deciding the case in order to suggest
that the amending process, or legislation may expand what
the Supreme Court has here done to secure uniform di-
vorce, but that the Court can go no further. Such a warn-
ing may or may not seem called for by the majority opin-
ion. There is nothing in its language to indicate any inten-
tion to go further than an overruling of the Haddock case;
and there is much to indicate a careful attempt to confine
the decision to just that.
The two dissenting opinions, despite this limitation of
the majority opinion, direct their reasoning largely to con-
demning the compulsory recognition of no-domicil di-
vorces. Because this is entirely consistent with what the
majority opinion purported to rule (namely that single-
domicil divorces must be recognized), the bulk of each
dissenting opinion could be said to be in concurrence with
what the majority has done. They are in disagreement
only if the majority meant to include the recognition of
all divorces granted after notice to the defendants and
regardless of domicil. They are dissents only so far as
they feel that the facts of the instant case, if inquired
into, really indicated no domicil in Nevada; and hence
they feel that the effect of the majority opinion is to make
all such divorces good. It would seem safe to assume
"' This point is discussed herein infra, circa n. 116, et seq.
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that this was not intended by the majority and is not the
result of the decision.7 The dissents might be essentially
reflections of an opinion of the dissenters that this was not
an appropriate case in which to re-determine the Haddock
problem of single domicil divorces.
To be sure, one could characterize the Court's setting
of the stage in the principal case, so as to make it a Haddock
problem, as a tour de force, and so Mr. Justice Jackson's
dissent seemed to argue. But it is well that the Court
made or seized the opportunity to bury the Haddock com-
promise. The arguments of Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr.
Justice Murphy of (1) the dilution of the sovereignty of
other states which results, and (2) the introduction of an
alleged undesirable rigidity into full faith and credit, are
directed considerably at the assumption of compulsory
recognition of divorces obtained without the domicil of
either party.
In so far as these arguments were directed at divorces
granted at the domicil of the parties plaintiff accompanied
by procedural due process, the majority opinion weighed
and surmounted them. As to the undue rigidity, the Court
felt that the scope for the play of local policy in the recog-
nition compelled by the full faith and credit clause for
judgments had always been slight48 (if not non-existent
to date except for the Haddock decision) as distinguished
from that allowed in connection with the inter-state recog-
47 The question of abandoning domicil as the jurisdictional basis is dis-
cussed herein infra, circa n. 71, et seq.
"I The Court, p. 211 (63 S. Ct.), after referring to Christmas v. Russell,
5 Wall. 290 (1866); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 (1908); Kenney
v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411 (1920); Titus v. Wallick, 306 U. S. 282,
291 (1939), quoted from Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 642 (1935),
"'the room left for the play of conflicting policies is a narrow one.' ", and
continued, "So far as judgments are concerned the decisions, as distin-
guished from dicta, show that the exceptions (to the rule of compulsory
recognition) have been few and far between, apart from Haddock v. Had-
dock." The Court indicated that the holding of Anglo-American Provision
Co. v. Davis, 191 U. S. 376 (1903) was not an exception but only an appli-
cation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The dicta exceptions re-
ferred to were: (1) the penal judgment exception of Huntington v.
Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 (1892) ; Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243 (1912) ;
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932), with a broad
caution to the express reservation of a ruling on this in Milwaukee County
v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 279 (1935) and (2) the general policy
exception dicta of the statute cases referred to In footnote 49 infra, and
also Broderick v. Rosner, 8upra.
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nition of statutes." As for the infringement on the sov-
ereignty of the State compelled to recognize, the Court
found such infringement to be no greater than that which
occurs in many of the multiple-contact situations that have
arisen in other fields of the law.?° Such infringement as
does occur, they found to be outweighed by the greater
good of securing universal validity of single-domicil
divorces. Actually the Williams and Hendrix case itself
does not have any substantially new impact on the sov-
ereignty of the recognizing state. It merely dictates a
consequence which formerly would have followed anyhow
for separate domicil divorces from the accidental presence
of one of alternative factors having nothing to do with
state sovereignty. The now abandoned distinctions of the
Haddock case were concerned with protecting the interests
of defendants who could not feasibly defend,"' not those
of states as sovereign entities.
The "sovereignty" of other states was already rather
badly damaged by the rules as they existed prior to the
principal case, which compelled other states to accept
double domicil divorces and some single domicil ones. But
it is hard to see how it is any further impaired by re-
quiring them to accept the remaining single domicil ones,
when previously they would have been compelled to accept
" At 63 S. Ct. 211 the Court said, "This Court, to be sure, has recognized
that in the case of statutes . . . some 'accommodation of the conflicting
interests of the two states is necessary.' " citing Bradford Electric Light Co.
v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n. v. Industrial Acci-
dent Comm., 294 U. S. 532, 547 (1935) ; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm., 306 U. S. 493, 502 (1938).
50 63 S. Ct. 215, saying "But such an objection goes to the application of
the full faith and credit clause to many situations. It is an objection in
varying degrees of intensity to the enforcement of a judgment of a sister
state based on a cause of action which could not be enforced in the state
of the forum. Mississippi's policy against gambling transactions was
overriden in Fauntleroy v. Lum, supra, when a Missouri judgment based
on such a Mississippi contract was enforced by this Court. Such is part of
the price of our federal system."
11 The essential thesis of the first of two articles about the matter by one
of the present writers, Strahorn, A Rationale of the Haddock Case (1938)
32 Ill. L. Rev. 796, 797-801, was that the Haddock distinctions were to be
explained in terms of the relative feasibility of defending, on the part
of non-resident defendants In the various situations, against unjust accusa-
tions of marital misconduct. It was argued that the Haddock case com-
pelled full faith and credit in situations where there was a relatively
greater feasibility of defending, and merely allowed local validity and
comity where that was relatively slighter.
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the very same divorces merely because of the accident
of something not concerned with sovereignty, i. e., local
service of process, or defendant's voluntary appearance
in the case, howsoever collusively given in order to escape
the sovereignty of the recognizing state.
It would, of course, more impair the sovereignty of other
states to do that which the minority seemed unduly to
fear, i. e., to compel other states to accept the granting
state's finding of domicil, or to accept divorces based only
on residence.52
VI.
REMAINING AREAs OF UNCERTAINTY
Granted that Williams and Hendrix v. North Carolina
is a desirable step in the clarification and simplification
of the inter-state divorce problem, it is easy to agree with
Mr. Justice Frankfurter that the millenium has not come
through this judicial decision. Perhaps, it cannot come
through court action alone. Although the area of un-
certainty as to the universal validity of divorces is now
considerably minimized, a good many factors of doubt still
remain for the speculation of divorce consultants. First,
if the jurisdiction basis for divorce is now settled as single
domicil without the complications of the Haddock case,
will judicial attention be directed to the procedural insuffi-
ciency of notice by publication? Secondly, does domicil
of one party become and will it remain the minimal contact
with a state so as to satisfy the requirements of due process
of law for the existence of divorce jurisdiction? Thirdly,
is it possible, as the minority opinions seem to suggest, that
less-than-domicil divorces may have a certain due process
validity in the state where rendered and in states which
choose to recognize them while being not entitled to com-
pulsory recognition elsewhere? Fourthly, is it possible,
as a footnote to the majority opinion might indicate, that
the Court may eventually hold for less extensive com-
pulsory 'recognition of sister-state divorces for some pur-
52 Infra, oirca n. 71, et seq.
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poses than for others? Fifthly, to what extent do the
recently expanded concepts of res-judicata as applied to
jurisdiction and the older doctrines of estoppel have to
be guarded against by divorce defendants? Finally, is
there a sphere in which Congress could dictate the policy
for inter-state recognition of divorce? These questions
are worthy of brief speculation in the light of this recent
return of the Supreme Court to the divorce problem.
VII.
NOTICE REQUIRED BY "PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS"
With reference to the first question, reasonableness of
notice, there would seem to be a fertile field for develop-
ment of procedural fairness in the granting of inter-state
divorce.53 In the principal case, it happened that there
was good notice through a method reasonably calculated
to reach the defendants and which actually did reach
them.54 There was, accordingly, no need specifically to
discuss the question. However, the Court stressed the
idea of the need for "procedural due process" in the grant-
ing State.55
Was not this emphasis on "procedural due process" a
hint that while the notice to defendant and opportunity
to defend aspects of due process were here satisfied and
called for no specific discussion, the Court wanted the
door open for a close scrutiny of them in the future?
Certainly, it takes no great stretch of the imagination to
recognize the unfairness of publication alone as a means
58 For an earlier treatment of the notice problem by one of the present
writers, carrying acknowledgment of the assistance of the other, see Stra-
horn, The Supreme Court Revisits Haddock (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 412,
418-423. See also to the effect that due process of law may require some-
thing better than mere newspaper publication, Leflar, Jurisdiction to Grant
Divorces (1935) 7 Miss. L. J. 445; and McClintock, Fault as an Element of
Divorce Jurisdiction (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 564.
5' See supra, notes 4 and 5, to the effect that Mrs. Williams was served
with a copy of the summons and complaint by a North Carolina sheriff in
North Carolina; and that notice was given Mr. Hendrix through newspaper
advertisement and mail to his last known address, which must have reached
him, inasmuch as he wrote and agreed to enter an appearance in the
divorce case, although he never did.
5 63 S. Ct. 207, 213, 214, 215.
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of notice in the usual single-domicil divorce case.5 6 Cer-
tainly, also, publication has been condemned for want of due
process in certain other modern specialized situations, where
service by registered mail, or some other form reasonably
calculated to reach the defendant, has been upheld.7 Does
the historical use of, and dictum acceptance of, publication
in divorce proceedings, in analogy to "in rem" procedure,
free the device from modern condemnation in recognition
of its inherent unfairness in situations where better forms
of notice are available (and at less expense to the parties) ."s
Assuredly, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to con-
demn doctrines with more fortification in their own de-
cisions than the device of mere publication as a means of
notice in divorce litigation. As far as the Supreme Court
is concerned, the doctrine has stood more by sufferance and
in dictum than by express approval. 9
5 Other writers seem to have felt similarly, supra, n. 53. For its ineffi-
cacy in another field see GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COM-
MENTS (1940) 528, quoting Byrne, Report of Investigation on Cost of Pro-
cedure of Mortgage Foreclosure (1936 W. P. A. Official Project No. 465-
97-46) 11: "The average cost of the publication of such notice is between
$125 and $150. It is undoubtedly a matter of general agreement among
practicing attorneys that the publication of such notice benefits no one,
excepting, of course, the newspapers obtaining such advertisement." This
would seem to be as true, if not more true, of publication of divorce notices.
57 For several instances consider: (1) Domicil as a basis of jurisdiction,
with service by publication condemned in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90
(1917), but with personal service outside the jurisdiction sustained in
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 454 (1940). Similar illustrations of a basis of
jurisdiction standing as constitutional when accompanied by a provision
for reasonable notice, although failing when coupled with inadequate
notice, exist in: (1) Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623 (1935) as against
Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289 (1919) ; (2) Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S.
351 (1927) as against Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U. S. 13 (1928)--cf. Grote v.
Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 A. 547 (1930) ; and perhaps (3) Corporation cases
as discussed by Reiblich, Jurisdiction of Maryland Courts Over Foreign
Corporations (1938) 3 Md. L. Rev. 35, 46, circa n. 44.
"I See n. 56, supra. MARSHALL AND MAY, THE DIVORCE COURT (1932) 322
indicates usual costs of publication in a normal divorce proceeding in Bal-
timore City of from $20 to $22. Certainly registered mail could be less
expensive. In the N. Y. Judicial Council's 4th Ann. Report and Studies
(1938) 188 ff., the inexpensive character of registered mail is only one of
the many arguments proposed for its general adoption as a form of notice.
Be Such dictum recognition of publication creeps into the instant opinion
63 S. Ct. 207, 210, as it did tacitly into the Haddock case, 201 U. S. 502
(1906), in the Court's recognizing at least local validity for the Connecticut
decree. Quaere whether such statements, or even express holdings on the
facts of cases where the form of notice was uncontested, can stand against
the notice requirements of "procedural due process" as established by cases
in other fields, and specifically directed at the notice point. See supra, n.
57. Of. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) Sec. 109.
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It might be interesting to observe in connection with
the two leading and controversial decisions of Atherton v.
Atherton" and Haddock v. Haddock,"' that there was rea-
sonable notice to the defendant (mailed copy of the bill
of complaint) in the former case where the single domicil
divorce was sustained, and no reasonable notice (publica-
tion only) in the latter case which denied compulsory full-
faith-and-credit under reasoning which had to be con-
demned in the instant decision of Williams and Hendrix
v. North Carolina.2 Could it not be surmised that, of the
things that seemed most distasteful about single domicil
divorces, at the time of the Haddock case and perhaps in
various state rulings, one was the possibility of their being
obtained without any knowledge of the defendant? 63  Was
not the cure the requirement of adequate notice, rather
than the imposition of the Haddock factors?
Now that the Haddock factors have been condemned,
will not the pressure for fairness to the absentee defend-
ant call for a better notice than publication if such better
notice is feasible? It might be said that such has already
been recognized as a requirement of due process by the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws.6" Some States (perhaps
many) of their own volition require better forms of notice
60181 U. S. 155 (1901).
01201 U. S. 562 (1906).
62 In Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938) the defendant actually entered
(at least a special) appearance after receiving notice of the case.
11 Adequacy of notice was not quite such a pressing problem so long as
the Haddock compromise lasted, because full faith and credit was dictated
by the Haddock case in two situations (personal service within the grant-
ing state and appearance in the case) which involved the presence of actual
notice to the defendant, and in two others (defendant domiciled in state
and "last marital domicil") wherein there was an unusually high likeli-
hood of actual notice reaching defendants through the usually followed
forms of substituted or newspaper advertisement service of process. The
fact of living, or having once lived in the state, would make it more plaus-
ible that friends would see the newspaper notice and forward information
about it to the defendant wheresoever located. See Strahorn, A Rationale
of the Haddock Case (1938) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 696, 799, n. 16, concerning an
unpublished statement of the late Professor Beale about the significance of
notice in the Haddock picture.
Of course It must be remembered that the Haddock case tolerated at
least local validity and comity for divorces where the chance of actual
notice was slightest, although it only dictated full faith and credit in the
four situations where it would either actually or very likely be received.
e'RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1935) Sec. 109. And see interpre-
tation by McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction (1928)
37 Yale L. J. 564, 577, 578.
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than publication. 5 Maryland, prior to 1941, allowed di-
vorces to be obtained against non-resident defendants upon
service through newspaper publication alone.6 In 1941,
the Maryland statute was amended so as to require the
published notice to be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant." While it might have
been simpler to have abolished the need for publication
altogether (except perhaps for cases where all other forms
had been tried and failed), it is submitted that requiring
service by mail was a desirable addition in that it might
have saved what was possibly an unconstitutional pro-
cedure as it earlier existed in cases where publication alone
was used.68
65 See II VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1932, and Supplement 1938)
Sec. 84. Through that date, at least, there seemed to be several States,
which like Maryland prior to 1941 (infra, n. 66), allowed for service by
publication against non-residents, with an optional alternative of personal
service outside of the state. A few, like Mississippi (C. 1930, Sec. 1417),
seemed to provide only for publication against non-residents. Most of the
states, more appropriately, seemed to allow for published notice as suffi-
cient only after better forms have been proved to be unavailing.
66 Md. Laws 1941, Ch. 516, added to the existing Md. Code (1939) Art. 16,
Sec. 38, a requirement of sending by registered mail a copy of the order of
publication to the last known address of a non-resident defendant in a
divorce case. As it reads, the registered mail notice is additional to the
alternatives provided by Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 149, which requires,
in the alternative, newspaper advertisement against a non-resident, or
proof of personal service of a copy of the order wherever he may be found,
to be made either by official certificate, affidavit, or written admission of
service. Under the recently enacted insanity divorce statute, Md. Laws
1941, Ch. 497, service against non-residents is had as in other suits in
equity against non-residents, although local service requires serving a copy
of the bill on defendant and on his Committee, or if none, on the institution
having his custody.
'7 In Harf v. Harf, Circ. Ct. for Balto. City, Baltimore Daily Record,
December 29, 1942, per Niles, J., it was held that where the non-resident
defendant resides at the time of trial in enemy territory to which registered
mail is currently not sent, then the mailing of registered mail notice is un-
necessary and mere publication is sufficient.
68 Senate Bill No. 35 has been introduced into the 1943 Legislature to
strike out the registered mail provision and reinstate the procedure as
before 1941. Should this be passed and approved, there would then arise
the possibility of divorces granted under the reinstated pre-1941 procedure
being held void under an eventual ruling that insufficient notice violates
due process of law. Should this eventually happen, the chances are that
merely those divorces granted on newspaper advertisement where a better
method was feasible would be invalidated, not all those granted under the
statute. For, the pre-1941 statute (as set out supra, n. 66) itself provided
an alternative of serving actual notice on the defendant wherever he could
be found, in lieu of mere advertisement in a newspaper. But this was a
mere option, where the registered mail provision of the 1941 law is manda-
tory. The presence of the option making better notice possible might save.
the general constitutionality of the pre-1941 statute in its entirety, but still
might lead to the Supreme Court's eventually holding specific divorces
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The instant decision, in specifically calling for "pro-
cedural due process" before full-faith-and-credit is ac-
corded to single-domicil divorces most assuredly leaves
the way open for a "notice" ruling. Until such ruling
is made by the Supreme Court, the question of whether
mere newspaper advertisement is adequate (at least where
better notice is feasible) contributes to the remaining
uncertainty as to the universal validity of divorces (at
least as long as there are states which, like Maryland prior
to 1941, grant divorces upon newspaper publication as the
usual form of notice) .9 It is to be hoped that the Court
will have an early opportunity (and will take it) to rule
definitely on this matter and thereby further minimize the
area of doubt in the field of interstate divorce.°
VIII.
DOMICIL AND RESIDENCE
While the Williams and Hendrix case has reduced the
area of doubt and uncertainty as to the universal validity
of divorces by deleting from significance the confusing
Haddock factors, yet the clear tenor of the majority opin-
obtained on mere newspaper advertisement where a better method is
feasible individually to be void, although the statute itself is valid and
divorces obtained with adequate notice are also valid.
69 upra, n. 66.
" The validity, for lack of adequate notice, of Maryland divorces obtained
on mere newspaper advertisement when a better method would have been
feasible, was attacked in the District of Columbia four years ago, and
almost reached the Supreme Court, but the latter Court denied certiorari,
possibly for waiver of the notice point at a lower stage of the case. In
Hellmuth v. Hellmuth, 98 F. (2d) 431, cert. den. 305 U. S. 673 (1938), the
husband, domiciled in Maryland, and allegedly knowing his wife's address
in the District of Columbia, obtained a Maryland divorce upon mere news-
paper advertisement in Maryland, the validity of which divorce she later
attempted to attack by a proceeding in the District. Apparently in the
trial court in the District she attacked the Maryland divorce as lacking due
process of law for insufficient notice, although on appeal to the Court of
Appeals of the District that point was abandoned and the mere objection
was made that the Maryland divorce was not entitled to full faith and
credit. The Court of Appeals of the District recognized the Maryland
divorce, deciding to grant comity under the Haddock case. On petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court, the wife's brief attempted to re-raise the
notice point, and dealt extensively with that phase of the case. The Court's
denial of certiorari can better be explained on the ground that the waiver of
the notice point below made the case an inappropriate one for their con-
sideration of that point, rather than on the ground that the then Maryland
type of notice satisfied due process of law. See, for treatment of the Hell-
muth case by one of the present writers, Strahorn, The Supreme Court
Revi8its Haddock (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 412, 418-423.
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ion is to continue to permit sister states to reject divorces
if, on collateral attack, they find themselves unable to
agree with the granting state's own finding of the presence
of the jurisdictional fact of domicil of at least one spouse.7
It is proposed now to discuss this remaining requirement
for full faith and credit and to speculate concerning pos-
sible developments revolving around it, and about the pos-
sibility of a maximum of certainty concerning the presence
of the necessary jurisdictional basis.
The utmost certainty in this regard, of course, would
follow from denying collateral attack for anything not
apparent on the face of the record. This would mean re-
quiring the dissenting party to go to the granting state
and there assert the fraud as to domicil under whatever
local procedures were available for undoing a judgment
for improprieties in its obtention. But this would be un-
duly burdensome and expensive to absent defendants.
Then, too, it would impose on the Court the alternative
of permitting the "tourist divorce" states too cavalierly to
reject such direct attack, 72 or of allowing mere fact appeals
71 It is interesting to speculate as to how far sister state divorces, granted
on mere colorable domicil, and still capable of rejection by Maryland courts
under the principal case and Walker v. Walker, 125 Md. 649, 94 A. 346
(1915), may be made to stand up in Maryland under local rules of pre-
sumption and burden of proof. In a typical case, say where a husband
obtains a "Reno" divorce from his first wife and marries a second, and
both "wives" are claiming his property after his death, in a Maryland
court, may not the second "wife" have a better chance than otherwise of
winning, and surmounting the possibility of a finding of no valid domicil
of the husband in Nevada, through two local rules set out hereafter? Under
Bowman v. Little, 101 Md. 273, 61 A. 223 (1905), proof of a second cere-
mony of marriage imposes a very difficult burden of proof of a prior mar-
riage the existence of which undissolved by death or divorce would make
the later ceremony bigamous. Under Schaffer v. Richardson, 125 Md. 88,
93 A. 391 (1915), when there has been sufficient proof of both a first and a
second marriage, a rebuttable presumption arises that the first has been
terminated by death or divorce. Under this latter rule, it is interesting to
speculate whether the presumption of obtaining a valid divorce somewhere
would remain even though the common spouse had attempted to obtain a
Nevada divorce itself found to be void. The rules of these two cases at
least make it relatively more difficult for a first wife to attempt to attack a
divorce as against a second wife.
12 For that matter, consider Ewald v. Ewakl, 167 Md. 594, 175 A. 464
(1934), where a husband sought to annul his marriage to his wife on the
ground that the divorce she had obtained from her first husband twelve
years before in the same Maryland court was invalid because of insufficient
evidence to support her then claim to be a resident of Maryland. The an-
nulment was denied, and the Court indicated strong reluctance to invali-
date a divorce after it was obtained, for lack of jurisdictional residence,
unless there was much stronger evidence against residence than would
cause them to dismiss the original divorce bill for that reason.
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to it much more frequently than has been the case or is
either desirable or possible.7" Such a rule would substan-
tially approximate permitting the easy divorce states
frankly to substitute residence for domicil as a jurisdic-
tional basis to entitle to full faith and credit. Despite the
undue fears of the dissenting justices in the principal case,
it is hardly thinkable that collateral attack will ever be
denied.74
But, granting that, it is not implausible that the Court
will mofe closely oversee the process of making collateral
attack in other states on the jurisdictional fact of domicil,
particularly if the stricter states attempt to scuttle the
Haddock repudiation by too readily finding the lack of
jurisdictional domicil in order to reject divorces which,
earlier, they would have rejected for lack of one of the
Haddock factors. Will, for instance, the Court permit the
stricter states to create presumptions against acquiring a
valid new domicil in the divorce granting state, or, as
North Carolina applied the rule in the trial of the principal
case,75 to put the burden, even on criminal defendants, on
those relying on such divorces to show a valid domicil
in the granting state, where otherwise the burden of proof
in the case would be elsewhere?
The stricter states may be able relatively longer to re-
ject the same divorces, for different reasons, because of
the discretionary nature of appealing such cases to the
Supreme Court.76 However, the Court may eventually
take an opportunity to increase the certainty about the
71 Practically all such appeals would be by discretionary certiorari, as it
would be unlikely that the granting of a divorce would be based on a state
statute the validity of which under Federal law could be drawn into
question so as to give an appeal as of right to the Supreme Court. See 28
U. S. C. A. (1928) Sec. 344; and ROBERTSON AND KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1936) 8-24.
7' 63 S. Ct. 207, 215: "In the first place, we repeat that in this case we
must assume that petitioners had a bona fide domicil in Nevada, not that
the Nevada domicil was a sham. We thus have no question on the present
record whether a divorce decree granted by the courts of one state to a
resident as distinguished from a domiciliary is entitled to full faith and
credit in another state. Nor do we reach here the question as to the power
of North Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees
because, contrary to the findings of the Nevada court, North Carolina finds
that no bona fide domicil was acquired in Nevada."
1 63 S. Ct. 207, 209, supra, n. 10.
70 See supra, n. 73.
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validity of divorces by enunciating rules regulating the
process of making collateral attack on the basic domicil.
A statement in the majority opinion indicates the pos-
sibility of inconsistencies in the extra-state processes of
finding the presence or lack of domicil on collateral attack,
and it would seem to restrict the basic issue on such col-
lateral attack to the minimum factors of physical presence
and intent to remain indefinitely as the basis of acquiring
a new domicil of choice. This, now, under the Williams
and Hendrix case is all that is needed to entitle a sister
state divorce to full faith and credit. After its casual refer-
ence to the Beale-Restatement factors as perhaps being of
significance to granting states in determining whom to
allow to file suits for divorce, the Court intimates that
(subject of course to its oversight as final arbiter) the
granting states may follow as liberal rules as to capacity
to acquire a new domicil as they may wish to provide,"'
subject merely to re-investigation elsewhere as to the bona
fides of the physical presence and intent to remain of
the plaintiff. It would seem clear that the stricter states
will not be allowed to reject some divorces because, by
their stricter rules, a married woman lacks capacity to
change her domicil, even though by the view of the grant-
ing state she does have capacity to acquire a separate
domicil. Certainly the Court will permit no more than
a re-investigation of the fact of change of domicil to the
granting state. Otherwise the confusion and uncertainty
of the abandoned Haddock factors will return in another
guise, if the plaintiffs must risk not only conflicting findings
as to facts, but conflicting rules as to capacity to change
domicil.
The overthrow of the Haddock factors, with the reten-
tion of domicil as a requisite jurisdictional basis subject to
collateral findings thereabout, might be expressed in terms
of relative risk. As the law now stands, spouses who are
married and living in states with stricter divorce policies
7 63 S. Ct. 207, 214: "But where a state adopts, as it has the power to
do, a less strict rule, it is quite another thing to say that its decrees af-
fecting the marital status of its domiciliaries are not entitled to full faith
and credit in sister states."
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run the risk of the other spouse deserting, going to a laxer
state,7" staying there the local residence period and obtain-
ing a divorce, and later being able to persuade any tribunal
in which the problem arises of his or her "intent to remain
indefinitely" in the granting state at the time of the divorce
proceeding. On the other hand, the spouse who leaves
and goes to the laxer, state, and there obtains a divorce
otherwise in compliance with local requirements, runs the
risk of being unable to persuade future tribunals of the
presence of that necessary intent requisite to change domi-
cil. Of course, lifelong residents of the laxer states run
somewhat the same risk, arising from suspicion on the
part of the stricter ones of divorces emanating from such
states. But it is a slighter risk than that run by those who
have recently moved into the granting state.
Preserving domicil as the minimal jurisdictional basis
(at least for compulsory extra-state recognition by full
faith and credit) does recognize the considerable interest
of the state of permanent location in determining the status
of its domiciliaries. The equality of claim as between the
state of defendant's domicil and that of plaintiff makes
the desirability of uniformity throw the scales in favor of
forcing the state of defendant's domicil to accept the
earlier determination by that of plaintiff. But, as between
the state of domicil of either or both of the spouses and
that of the mere physical residence of plaintiff, even the
desire for uniformity and certainty as to validity of di-
vorces is not sufficient to weigh in the balance in favor of
compulsory recognition (possibly not even of local valid-
ity) 79 for mere residence divorces. For to take the latter
stand would substantially impair the sovereignty of other
states and give increased recognition to that of the grant-
71 While some law has developed in a few other states about the granting
of injunctions against prosecuting divorce cases in other states, for lack of
bona fide domicil there, this has not yet been specifically passed on by the
Maryland Court of Appeals. In Bank v. Bank, 23 A. (2d) 700, the plaintiff
had sought an injunction against the defendant wife's prosecuting a Florida
divorce action, but the divorce was obtained before personal service on the
defendant in the injunction suit could be had.
79 See infra, circa n. 84, et seq., for treatment of the possible local validity
and comity recognition of mere residence divorces.
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ing state when it is much less entitled thereto than if
it be the state of domicil of the plaintiff.
And yet, despite the relatively greater impact on sov-
ereignty, and the relatively slighter claim of the granting
state to the privilege of regulating status, there can be
stated arguments for the highly problematical step that
the Court might eventually take, of repudiating the Bell
and Andrews cases 0 and frankly substituting residence for
domicil as the necessary jurisdictional basis for full faith
and credit. It is here described as problematical, although
the dissenting opinions and newspaper comment seemed
to fear that the majority opinion was accomplishing or
would accomplish just that.
One argument would be, of course, that such a step
would be but a further extension of the philosophy of the
Williams and Hendrix case in its step of overthrowing
the Haddock compromise in favor of further release from
uncertainty as to the universal validity of divorces. Such
a step would remove the uncertainty due to conflicting find-
ings as to necessary domicil, with its elusive concept "in-
tent to remain indefinitely", and substitute an uncertainty
which is minuscule in comparison, physical presence for
a certain period. By way of compromise, if the Court
were willing to substitute residence for domicil, it
could set up a minimum period of residence, as a reason-
able period, certainly a longer one than the ridiculous six
weeks of the Nevada law, perhaps even one year.
While, of course, the answer to this is that it is hardly
within the purview of the judicial function of deciding
cases to legislate as to the exact length of a period of
residence, yet it would be but a retreat to the days when
the courts of their own motion did set up periods regarded
as jurally significant for needful purposes.8' A somewhat
analogous step would be to preserve domicil as a require-
10 Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901) ; and Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S.
14 (1903).81 Many of the common law rules fixing age periods for various purposes,
such as the age of majority, the age to marry, that for criminal guilt, and
others, are judge-made. To be sure, it might be answered that the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution makes this a matter of State
action, not Federal.
1942]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ment, but to impose a presumption in its favor from resi-
dence for a certain period. Many similar presumptions
are judge-made.
Stating it in terms of risk, should the Court shift from
domicil to residence, it could be said that subjecting the
deserted spouse to the risk that the other would leave
and spend, say, a year in one of the laxer states and there
get a valid divorce is not much more risk than now fol-
lows under the principal case, that the deserter will spend
six weeks elsewhere and get a divorce, and then be able
to persuade any future court of the elusive "intent."
Thinking in terms of realities, we should recall that
many people, some prominent, are making use of these
tourist divorces, remarrying in reliance on them, begetting
children whose legitimacy is in doubt so long as there is
a possibility of successful collateral attack on domicil, but
living in a state of what the popular press delights to call
"sin". Perhaps there is some social policy in accommodat-
ing the law to the realities, despite Mr. Justice Jackson's
dissent (aimed at the argument for insuring legitimacy)
that the Court's concern should be more for the regularity
of the law than for the regularity of pedigrees.82
With reference to the impingement on the sovereignty
of other states, it could be argued that there would result
but more of an invasion already begun by the long-time
requirement of full faith and credit for double domicil
divorces and for most (now all) single domicil ones. The
trend has been toward a greater certainty as to the validity
of divorces actually granted, all through the undisturbed
part of the Haddock case, the Davis case, and the one under
discussion. While, as was pointed out, the principal case
does not accomplish any substantially new invasion of
sovereignty, yet it does show a desire for certainty and
uniformity which may eventually prove strong enough to
justify the definite invasion of other states' sovereignty
which would follow from the highly problematical step
of substituting residence for domicil.
82 63 S. Ct. 207, 225.
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The most cogent argument against that, of course, was
brought out in the dissenting opinions, that to compel uni-
versal validity for all actually granted divorces would
make the national level that of the laxest state, and force
the states with stricter attitudes toward marriage and di-
vorce to bow to the more lax rules of the others, a step
undesirable in our Federal system.8" Of course, some
thought should be given to whether, perhaps, the strict
states have been too strict, just as the lax states have been
too lax, and whether, within the limits of the judicial power
(doubted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion)
the Supreme Court can strike a balance whereby it can
keep the laxer states from being too lax and, at the same
time, by forcing the stricter states to accept some divorces
they do not like, suggest to them that they might as well
not be so strict.
The making of predictions in the matter is dangerous
and no attempt is here made to predict that the Court will
ever substitute residence for domicil, or make the granting
state's findings conclusive. It would be safer, perhaps, to
suggest that if this ever does happen, the sequence will
more than likely be similar to that of the recognition of
single domicil divorces, viz., first, mere local validity and
perhaps voluntary comity elsewhere for such less attrac-
tive divorces, and then, much later, the compulsion of
full faith and credit. It may be that history will repeat
itself. But, it is only a matter of speculation now whether
the Court is yet ready even to concede mere local validity
for residence divorces granted without domicil. Whether
so is the subject of the discussion immediately following.
IX.
A FUTURE "LAG" FOR RESIDENCE DIVORCES?
Certain hints in the dissenting opinions in the prin-
cipal case tend to suggest that divorces granted on the
basis of mere colorable domicil or upon residence alone
may be allowed a quantum of validity by the Supreme
Is Particularly under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.
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Court,84 even though it is not ready (the fears of the
minority of the justices to the contrary) to compel recog-
nition under full faith and credit for such least attractive
foreign divorces.
These hints are to the effect that mere colorable domicil
or residence divorces granted in the laxer states although
not entitled to full faith and credit, may, nevertheless, be
valid in the states where granted for purely local purposes,
on the theory that it is within the powers of a state to
deal as it sees fit with such residents for purely domestic
purposes, so long as it satisfies procedural due process.
To be sure, the majority opinion apparently adhered to
the traditional view that a divorce granted without domicil
of either party was void, even where rendered, and it
particularly seemed to emphasize that the desideratum
was to make divorces either valid everywhere or valid
nowhere.8 5 The traditional view has been that it would
violate due process of law to enforce, even in the granting
state, a divorce granted without domicil of either party
and, of course, such divorces have been entitled in the
past neither to comity nor to full faith and credit.86
The question of the local enforceability of an actually
granted, although questionable domicil divorce, is a rather
8, Mr. Justice Murphy, 63 S. Ct. 207, 218: "This is not to say that the
Nevada decrees are without any legal effect in the State of Nevada. That
question is not before us. It may be that for the purposes of that state the
petitioners have been released from their marital vows, consistently with
the procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, on the basis of
compliance with its residential requirements and constructive service of
process on the non-resident spouses." Mr. Justice Jackson, 63 S. Ct. 207,
223: "To hold that the Nevada judgments were not binding in North Caro-
lina because they were rendered without jurisdiction over the North Caro-
lina spouses, it is not necessary to hold that they were without any con-
ceivable validity. It may be, and probably is, true that Nevada has suffi-
cient interest in the lives of those who sojourn there to free them and their
spouses to take new spouses without incurring criminal penalties under
Nevada law. I know of nothing in our Constitution that requires Nevada to
adhere to traditional concepts of bigamous unions or the legitimacy of the
fruit thereof. And the control of a state over property within its borders is
so complete that I suppose that Nevada could effectively deal with it in the
name of divorce as completely as in any other."
These would seem to indicate that the dissenting justices were willing to
pay the price of broadening the "lag" of the Haddock case, rather than to
have full faith and credit compelled for the residue of the single domicil
divorces already within that lag between local validity-voluntary recogni-
tion and compulsory full faith and credit.
85 63 S. Ct. 207, 214-16.
16 See supra, n. 17.
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abstract one, anyhow, for the reason that collateral attack
on it in the courts of the granting state is relatively diffi-
cult, as against such attack elsewhere. There is always
the possibility that the local rule will deny collateral at-
tack in the same state and force a re-litigation of the prob-
lem in the very court granting the divorce, by way of re-
opening the divorce decree, a path fraught with dangers,
as anyone familiar with the Maryland detail in that field
can testify. 7 Or there is the possibility that, on reopening
the question, any court of the divorce granting state will
be as reluctant to find no domicil as was the particular
court which granted it."8
If the tribunal of the granting state too readily rejects
proof of no domicil on re-opening of the divorce case or
collateral attack, it might be said that there is always the
possibility of appeal to the Supreme Court on the due
process point, the only way the question could be ulti-
mately determined. But, aside from the fact that such
appeals are by discretionary certiorari and none has re-
cently come to decision, it is, after all, a fact problem and
the Court will probably be reluctant to entertain mere
fact appeals. Then, too, the administrative agencies of
the granting state will accept the divorce as valid until
set aside in the courts. Thus, divorces granted by the
laxer states on the basis of mere colorable domicil already
have a rather substantial, if not constitutional local validity.
On the other hand, if the Court should ever definitely
rule that colorable domicil divorces are invalid and not
capable of enforcement even in the state where rendered,
as a matter of due process of law, the basic authority for
accomplishing this would be Pennoyer v. Neff, 9 which
held that a state could not exercise jurisdiction over prop-
erty within its borders, which it could affect by a proper
in rem proceeding, through the medium of a personal judg-
s, Simms v. Simms, 178 Md. 350, 13 A. (2d) 326 (1940), is the latest
Maryland case on the complications incidental to reopening a Maryland
divorce case because of fraud in the obtention of the divorce.
88 See Ewald v. Ewald, 167 Md. 594, 175 A. 464 (1934), discussed supra,
n. 72, as indicative of a relative reluctance on the part of the Maryland
Court to make a later finding of no domicil after a local divorce has once
been granted.
8995 U. S. 714 (1877).
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ment invalid for want of a sufficient jurisdictional contact.
A void judgment cannot be enforced, even against persons
and things subject to the state's power at the time of at-
tempted enforcement.
But if local validity for mere residence decrees even-
tually obtains the sanction of the Court's decision, then
there will be recreated a "lag" between local validity as
a matter of due process, and compulsory recognition as
a matter of full faith and credit, similar to the lag which
survived for 37 years under the Haddock case?0 But it
will be another kind of lag, different in detail and in its
raison d'dtre. Under the Haddock case the lag, now abol-
ished, was considered to exist as to certain (the less at-
tractive of the) single domicil divorces. Under the possible
implications of the hint given by the minority, it will be
a lag solely with reference to no-domicil divorces. This
lag, of course, existed prior to the present decision, if it
exists at all, but was not previously brought into sharp
focus. It is also interesting to speculate whether, if there
is going to be a new and different kind of lag, as to how
different it will be in inner detail. Will, for instance, other
states also be permitted to grant comity to these least
desirable divorces granted on mere residence without
domicil, as was done under the Haddock lag for the less
desirable group of the single domicil ones?
It was previously rationalized that the Haddock case
struck a compromise (now repudiated) between the more
attractive ones and the less attractive of the single domicil
divorces, on the basis of the defendant's feasibility of
defending against unjust accusations of marital miscon-
duct." The possible new lag, if it ever is fully recognized,
will strike a compromise between all the more attractive
"0An interesting aspect of the literature of the Haddock case was the
reluctance of certain writers to admit that a divorce could be valid where
granted and entitled to comity elsewhere without being entitled to full
faith and credit. See, for a treatment of Professor Beale's views about this,
Strahorn, A Rationale of the Haddock Case (1938) 32 111. L. Rev. 796, 808-
815. A similar reluctance to believe in the "lag" of the Haddock case was
evinced in VREELAND, VALIDITY OF FOREIGN DIVORCEs (1938) 76-80, where
the author described as "revolutionary" what was nothing more than the
grant of comity under the Haddock case by the courts of the District of
Columbia in Atkinson v. Atkinson, 82 F. (2d) 847 (C. A. D. C. 1936).
11 Strahorn, A Rationale of the Haddock Case (1938) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 796.
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domicil divorces and the less attractive residence ones, in
terms of the relative claims of the state of residence and
the state of domicil to determine the marital affairs of
the particular individual. The Haddock distinction was,
while it lasted, essentially a compromise; and any granting
of constitutional local validity to mere residence divorces
will be that, too. Such a move would as much attempt to
strike a middle ground between the competing claimants
as did the older case in another connection. '
The Haddock compromise was, after all, a "Judgment
of Solomon,"92 and its consequences of uncertainty as to
the universal validity of single domicil divorces from sis-
ter states seem to have been recognized by the Court now
as almost as drastic as Solomon's order to carve the baby
into two pieces. The Haddock case emulated the mighty
Solomon's judgment by giving each of the spouses partial
relief or protection in a situation where the particular type
of separate domicil divorce put at a minimum the defend-
ant's "feasibility of defending" against trumped up charges.
It felt that it would be unfair to plaintiffs to require com-
plete personal jurisdiction before such a divorce could
have even local validity, and yet, without that, it would be
unfair to defendants to force universal extra-state validity
for such divorce. Thus, plaintiffs got the solace of locally
valid relief and the possibility of extra-state recognition,
and defendants were permitted the sanctuary of locating
or continuing domiciles in states choosing not to recognize
such divorces.
The later possible creation of an analogous "lag" for
residence divorces would, of course, tend more to resolve
competing claims between the states of domicil and of
residence, but it would also do somewhat the same things
as the Haddock compromise did for the parties, for the
plaintiff would be secure if he and his property remained
in the granting state, and the defendant would be secure
in person by remaining in, and in property by keeping it
in, the stricter state. Each spouse would get a certain
limited benefit from the situation if mere residence di-
9I Kings III-16, 25.
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vorces are allowed constitutional local validity (perhaps
comity elsewhere) by the Supreme Court.9 3
If, despite that the Court in the principal case has re-
jected compromise and lag for the single domicil situa-
tions, it ever reinstates another kind of a lag for the resi-
dence divorces, such a move might indicate that while
residence divorces are not as attractive as single domicil
ones, and hence not entitled to quite as much recognition,
yet they have enough in their favor to receive the same
halting recognition that, 37 years ago, an earlier Court
was willing to accord the less attractive among the single
domicil ones. Persons who rely on residence have less
to commend them to the Court than those who rely on
domicil and yet, considering the interests of the state of
residence, they may thereby eventually be held to be en-
titled to a limited recognition of the compromise and lag
nature.
X.
A FUTURE "LAG" AS TO EFFECT OF DIVORCE
ON PROPERTY?
Furthermore, a casual footnote in the majority opinion
suggests that there may be with us a different kind of
a lag, namely, that a state might be able the more readily
to disregard a foreign divorce for purposes of property
interests than for other, more personal aspects of the mar-
ital relation. 4 If this hint should ever be carried out,
91 It is not so conceivable that the Court will ever adopt the "lag" tech-
nique as the way of solving the problem of adequacy of notice, although it
would be one way of handling the matter, viz., by granting local validity
(possibly comity) where the notice is merely constructive, and compelling
full faith and credit where it is actual (or the best possible means were
used). See supra, n. 63, to the effect that the very "lag" of the Haddock
case itself could have been explained on the ground that notice was actual
or very probable under the Haddock factors and not so likely for those
divorces entitled only to local validity and comity.
163 S. Ct. 207, 210-11, ns. 4 and 5: "4. Thus we have here no question
as to extraterritorial effect of a divorce decree insofar as it affects property
in another state. See the cases cited, infra, note 5.
"5. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65, 23 L. R. A., N. S.,
924, 17 Ann. Cas. 853; Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U. S. 386, 30 S. Ct. 292, 54
L. Ed. 530, 25 L. R. A., N. S., 1292; Hood v. McGehee, 237 U. S. 611, 35
S. Ct. 718, 59 L. Ed. 1144. These decisions refuse to require courts of one
state to allow acts or judgments of another to control the disposition or
devolution of realty in the former. They seem to rest on the doctrine that
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there would then result a rather slight (but far from com-
plete) recognition of Professor Bingham's views as to the
"discrete" elements of the marital relation with reference
'to interstate jurisdiction, although the action of the Court
in the principal case definitely destroys his main thesis
as to which states have what jurisdiction over the various
personal aspects of a given marital relation. For, had Pro-
fessor Bingham's thesis been completely correct then, with-
out overruling the Haddock case, and merely within its im-
port as interpreted by him, the Court could have forced
North Carolina to recognize a divorce granted one (as-
sumed to be) separately domiciled in the granting state,
with reference to his capacity to remarry. 5 But they did
overrule the Haddock case in order to compel extra-state
recognition for that purpose.
Such a rule as hinted at by the majority footnote might
be analogized to that of Whittington v. McCaskill, 6 where
the Florida court recognized a foreign miscegenous mar-
riage for purposes of the devolution of property, although
the state where the land is located is 'sole mistress' of its rules of real
property. See Hood v. McGehee, supra, 237 U. S. at page 615, 35 S. Ct. at
page 719, 59 L. Ed. 1144; and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes
in Fall v. Bastin, supra, 215 U. S. at page 14, 30 S. Ct. at page 9, 54 L. Ed.
65, 23 L. R. A., N. S., 924, 17 Ann. Cas. 853."
01 Bingham, The Ameriean Law Institute v. The Supreme Court (1936) 21
Corn. L. Q. 393. Mr. Bingham's explanation is that the marital relation
involves seven "discrete" elements, viz., the respective rights of the spouses
to remarry, the respective claims of each on the other for support; the re-
spective claims of each on the other's property; and (seventh) the recip-
rocal rights and duties of living together. His thesis is that, when the
spouses have separate domicils, the state of husband's domicil determines
his right to remarry, but the state of wife's domicil determines hers. But
even under the Haddock case, insofar as full faith and credit was com-
pelled, and now even further because it is compelled more extensively, this
thesis fails, because the Court in the principal case emphasizes the desid-
eratum of insuring the certainty of the validity of remarriages in reliance
on single domicil divorces. The hint as to a property "lag" in the majority
opinion footnote does suggest a partial recognition of his thesis in that
limited respect, but the combination of the principal case and that of Yar-
borough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202 (1933) would seem to indicate that
the state of one spouse's domicil can bind that of the other's domicil with
reference to the personal and support aspects of the marital relation. For
comment on Professor Bingham's views, see Strahorn, A Rationale of the
Haddock Case (1938) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 796, 813-815.
In Coon, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942)
462, n. 14, published before the Williams and Hendrix case was decided,
enthusiasm for Professor Bingham's views is indicated. Ibid, 467 mentions
the Haddock factors.
" 65 Fla. 162, 61 So. 236, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 630, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1001
(1913).
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they might not have done so had it been a matter of allow-
ing the spouses to live together in Florida.
To have a divorce valid (or recognition compellable)
for some purposes but not for others, if substantial reasons
supported such a compromise between conflicting claims,
would be no more unthinkable than to have recognition
compellable in the presence of certain facts and not in their
absence, as existed at one level for 37 years with reference
to some single domicil divorces, and might exist at another
level in the future with reference to mere residence ones.
This vertical type of compromise might even be a more
justifiable one than the other, horizontal type of the Had-
dock case and the hint of the minority opinions.
XI.
ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA
The next point of uncertainty, and one that may have
considerable significance, is the extent to which the doc-
trines of res judicata and estoppel may apply to give an
effect to divorces otherwise invalid where rendered, or at
least incapable of securing compulsory full faith and credit,
for lack of domicil.
Considering first the older doctrine of estoppel, it needs
merely to be observed that the doctrine had been applied
sufficiently in the divorce field for the Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws to state the law to be that "The validity of a
divorce decree cannot be questioned in a proceeding con-
cerning any right or other interest arising out of the mari-
tal relation, either by a spouse who has obtained such
decree of divorce from a court which had no jurisdiction
or by a spouse who takes advantage of such decree by
remarrying. '97  While applied in only a limited number
of states to date, this doctrine has had interesting develop-
ment not calling for discussion here. s Suffice it to say
that it must be reckoned with in those states where it has
1, Sec. 112.
98 Bledsoe v. Seaman, 77 Kan. 679, 95 P. 576 (1908) ; Krause v. Krause,
282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. (2d) 290 (1940) and cases cited therein. And see
LORENZEN, CASES ON CoNsticT OF LAWS (4th ed. 1937) 782-784.
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been highly developed, and might well be a source of
new decision in any state where not yet applied.9  Noth-
ing in the instant decision would seem to affect its opera-
tion, except that the field of its possible application is cur-
tailed to that of divorce based on less-than-domicil.
The correctness of the application of doctrines of es-
toppel to parties obtaining or acting upon otherwise in-
valid divorces receives a certain sanction from the fairly
recent application of res judicata to the fact of domicil
as a basis for jurisdiction. In Davis v. Davis,10 the only
real treatment of the Haddock problem in the Supreme
Court in the interval between that case and the principal
one,' °l the Court held that if the non-resident defendant
appeared and contested the validity of the plaintiff's
domicil and lost on that issue, the matter became res
judicata between the parties and could not be made the
subject of later collateral attack by the defendant. This
was an unheralded, and by many unexpected," 2 applica-
tion of the res judicata doctrine to a court's jurisdiction
over status. Since Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling Men's
"No Maryland case has specifically ruled on the application of the
doctrine of estoppel in so many words, although Staub v. Staub, 170 Md.
202, 183 A. 605 (1936) could have been handled on that basis. In that
case the spouses both resided in Maryland at the time of the marriage and
up to their separation, at which time the wife went to Arkansas and there
obtained a divorce upon order of publication within four months of the time
of the separation. She later filed a Maryland proceeding against the hus-
band seeking alimony without divorce, and this proceeding was dismissed
on the ground that only a wife can file such a proceeding, and through the
Arkansas proceeding she had ceased to be defendant's wife. There was no
specific mention of the possible invalidity of the Arkansas divorce but, in
substance at least, the Court recognized an estoppel against her to contest
it, she having obtained it, even if there could have been raised an' question
of the sufficiency of her Arkansas residence.
100 Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938), discussed in Strahorn, The
Supreme Court Revisits Haddock (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 412, 414-418. This
treatment of the Davis case was entirely from the angle of its possible
extension of the Haddock factors, a matter now moot since the Williams
and Hendrix case has gone the whole way with respect to single domicil
divorces. The only mention of the res judicata aspect of the Davis case,
now its principal angle, was in n. 33.
101 The only case reaching the Supreme Court in the interval between the
Haddock case and the Davis case was Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S.
551 (1913) which, on its facts, without discussion of any difference, applied
the rule of the Atherton case, to the recognition of partial divorces.102 GOODRICn, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) p. 555. RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) Sec. 451, caveat. See also: Medina, Conclusive-
ness of Rulings on Jurisdiction (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 238; Gavit, Juris-
diction of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata (1932) 80 U. of P. L. Rev.
386.
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Assn.,"°3 it had been conceded that a losing contest of a
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction would preclude
later collateral attack. But many felt that the policy in
favor of prompt and final settlement of disputes could not
be extended to include the application of doctrines of res
judicata to the court's power over the subject matter in
a proceeding in rem, or over the analogous "status" in a
divorce proceeding, considerably on the theory that it
would be allowing the parties by their consent to confer
jurisdiction. Such theories received a rude shock on the
day of the Davis decision, for the opinion was then filed in
a companion case, Stoll v. Gottlieb,04 which applied the
doctrine of res judicata to support in rem jurisdiction. This
plus the Davis case's citation of the Baldwin v. Iowa Travel-
ing Men's Assn. case as authority for its action could leave
little doubt but that the Supreme Court of the United
States had incorporated the doctrines of res judicata as
to jurisdiction into the matter of compulsory recognition
of judgments whether personal jurisdiction, jurisdiction
in rem, or jurisdiction over status be involved.
The significance for the instant discussion is the need
for speculation as to how broadly these doctrines may
operate to secure greater uniformity of inter-state recog-
nition for divorces. Clearly on the facts of the Davis
case, some facts to support domicil plus contest of domicil
will preclude later collateral attack. Will appearance and
contest of domicil, regardless of the facts have the same
effect?' ° What of appearance of the party defendant with-
out any contest? Does the earlier Andrews case, 0 6 which
denied validity to a no-domicil divorce, despite the appear-
ance of the defendant, preclude this, or is it overruled
in effect by the recent res judicata decisions? If appear-
10' Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 283 U. S. 522 (1931).
See also references n. 102, supra.
104 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938).
10' See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) Sec. 10, infra, circa n. 113. See
articles supra, n. 102; also, Boskey and Braucher, Jurisdiction and Col-
lateral Attack: October Term, 1939 (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 1006; Comment,
Judgment on Merits as Res Judicata of Jurisdiction Over Subject Matter
(1940) 49 Yale L. J. 959; Comment, The Effect of Extra-Jurisdictional De-
cisions (1940) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 567.
"
6 Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (1903).
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ance could be sufficient to establish res judicata, would
personal jurisdiction of the defendant, regardless of ap-
pearance or contest be sufficient?1" ' If the law goes that
far, what would prevent binding a defendant who merely
had adequate notice of the proceedings (particularly if
there were some facts to support domicil-but perhaps
even regardless of this)? Will the doctrine ever be car-
ried so far as to hold that any divorce of record based on
allegations of jurisdiction and proper procedural protec-
tions to defendant will be capable of only direct attack?
Unquestionably, a line is to be drawn short of this extreme.
But, outside the sphere of interstate recognition, certain
decisions as to res judicata over subject-matter have bound
the parties even though they had not contested jurisdiction,
but because they might have contested it.'08 Such hold-
ings would seem to raise a flag of caution to the lawyer
in this field.10 9 Certainly, if a defendant spouse has notice
of a suit's pendency, careful thought must be given to
the choice between appearing and contesting both domicil
and merits, 110 in which event he may lose on both and
be forever precluded, or staying away in the hope of at-
tacking the necessary domicil for the first time collaterally.
A judgment must be made, of course, as to the extent
to which the Supreme Court would support a due process
appeal for want of jurisdiction on the fact of domicil in
107 See supra, n. 105. Also consider the possible implications of Riley v.
New York Trust Co., 62 S. Ct. 608 (1942).
10 See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938) ; Chicot County Drainage
District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940); Jackson v. Irving
Trust Co., 311 U. S. 494 (1941) ; article by Boskey and Braucher, supra, n.
105.
109 Some consideration might also be given to the implications in the
divorce field of Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66 (1939) which
applied the principle of res judicata to an Idaho district court's determina-
tion that a Washington probate court lacked jurisdiction to determine
ownership of certain stock, even though the jurisdiction point had been
raised and determined in the prior Washington proceedings contrary to the
Idaho court's determination and even though Idaho's action might have
been a denial of full faith and credit to the Washington action. The same
situation might occur as to two inconsistent judgments determining power
to adjudicate marital rights.
110 Now that an "appearance" is no longer a significant alternative factor
to compel full faith and credit, the Haddock case having been overruled, it
ceases to be a matter of moment whether the appearance be special or
general, and the speculation as to that aspect of the Davis case, found in
Strahorn, The Supreme Court Revisits Haddock (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 412,
415-416 is no longer relevant.
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the granting state if the chance is taken of entering an
appearance there.'11 As against this, one must weigh the
possibilities of being bound by res judicata as to juris-
diction even without appearance in the granting state
(as through notice and opportunity to contest-coupled
with whatever facts the Court might deem sufficient to
establish it). How probable the latter is, it is beyond the
purpose of this article to predict except through weighing
the questions above raised against the cases above referred
to.112 Off-hand, the Davis case seems to have gone far
enough in this field with the doctrine of res judicata applied
in the event of actual appearance by the defendant and
contest of the domicil point.
Perhaps one could obtain some guidance from glancing
at the Restatement of Judgments and its recently pro-
jected description of the law of res judicata and jurisdic-
tion over the subject-matter as a purely intra-state proposi-
tion. Section 10 reads: 113
"(1) Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties
and determines that it has jurisdiction over the sub-
ject-matter, the parties cannot collaterally attack the
judgment on the ground that the court did not have
jurisdiction over the subject-matter, unless the policy
underlying the doctrine of res judicata is outweighed
by the policy against permitting the court to act be-
yond its jurisdiction.
"(2) Among the factors appropriate to be consid-
ered in determining that collateral attack should be
permitted are that
"(a) the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
was clear;
"(b) the determination as to jurisdiction depended
upon a question of law rather than of fact;
"(c) the court was one of limited and not of gen-
eral jurisdiction;
"(d) the question of jurisdiction was not actually
litigated;
See supra, n. 72, as to the relative difficulty of appealing divorce cases
to the Supreme Court of the United States.
112 Supra, circa notes 100-109.
11' Cited supra, n. 105.
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"(e) the policy against the court's acting beyond
its jurisdiction is strong."
Granted similar tests will apply in the field of full faith
and credit (and this merely suggests the possibility of a
res judicata lag, without more discussion of it),"' how
will the Supreme Court balance the "policy underlying
the doctrine of res judicata" and the "policy against per-
mitting the state divorce court to act beyond its jurisdic-
tion?"" 5
XII.
THE POWER OF CONGRESS
The final question, that of the power of Congress in
the matter of interstate divorce, was hinted at in the ma-
jority opinion'1 6 and raised specifically in two sentences
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, saying: "7
"Congress has not exercised its power under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause to meet the special prob-
lems raised by divorce decrees. There will be time
enough to consider the scope of its power in this regard
when Congress chooses to exercise it."
As earlier indicated, Justice Frankfurter had referred
to the power over divorce granted to the national legis-
latures of Canada and Australia, and to the movement
sporadically arising in this country for a similar authority
for Congress over national divorce through constitutional
amendment. Although recognizing the legal certainty of
such a method of securing uniformity, it is not the purpose
"' By res judicata "lag" is meant the possibility that the Supreme Court
will the more readily tolerate the granting state's holding that domicil of
the plaintiff is res judicata than it will compel other states to recognize
the divorce on the same basis. For discussion of other possible "lags", see
infra, circa n. 84, et seq.; infra, circa n. 94, et 8eq.; and infra, n. 93.
I" This includes what will the Suprente Court think is beyond a State's
power to confer on its courts by way of divorce jurisdiction. See supra,
part VIII.
" 63 S. Ct. 207, 215: "Whether Congress has the power to create excep-
tions (see Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 215, 54 S. Ct. 181, 186,
78 L. Ed. 269, 90 A. L. R. 924, note 2, dissenting opinion) is a question on
which we express no view. It is sufficient here to note that Congress
in its sweeping requirement that judgments of the courts of one state be
given full faith and credit in the courts of another has not done so."
. 7 63 S. Ct. 207, 217.
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of this article to go into the desirability of a constitutional
amendment giving Congress power over marriage and di-
vorce.1 ' Nor is it the purpose to go into the constitution-
ality of such legislation without amendment, nor into the
desirability of uniformly enacted legislation by the several
state legislatures. lisa
The opinion references above, however, do suggest a
more immediately relevant problem, which can only be
treated by speculation. Could Congress, under its power
to enforce the full faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion, do anything specific about the problem of the inter-
state recognition of sister state divorces? Would a Fed-
eral statute be constitutional which purported to overrule
the Williams and Hendrix case in order to reinstate that
of the Haddock case, or even a stricter rule, say to require
domicil of both spouses, or a re-finding of the fault of the
absent spouse in the separation? Could Congress legislate
as to when a married woman might acquire a separate
domicil for divorce purposes? Could it, say, take a more
liberal slant and substitute residence for domicil as the
basis of divorce jurisdiction and also fix the minimum
period of residence for the states to require before enter-
taining suits? Could it settle the notice question? All
these are interesting possibilities of a latent source of Con-
gressional power, namely that to implement by appropriate
legislation the full faith and credit clause.
The constitutional provision is brief, saying:" 9
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each State
to the Public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings
of every other State. And the Congress may by gen-
eral Laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts,
Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof."
See Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal System (1936) 20
Minn. L. Rev. 140, 183, n. 133, suggesting the need for nationally controlling
legislation on the Haddock problem, but saying "amendment to federalize
the whole regulation of marriage and divorce would be better."
21"Compare the UNIFORM ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
(adopted in Delaware, New Jersey, and Wisconsin) as discussed (1923) 36
Mich. L. Rev. 922 and the UNI'oRM DIVORCE JURISDICTION ACT, 9 UNIFORM
LAWS ANN. (1932) 133,
0 U. S. Const., Art. IV, See. 1.
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Until now, under the authority as given, Congress has
merely prescribed by statute the method of authentication
and proof of records and judicial proceedings and provided
that "the said records and judicial proceedings, so authenti-
cated, shall have such faith and credit given to them in
every court within the United States as they have by law
or usage in the courts of the State from which they are
taken.,'120
There has been some discussion in legal literature about
the failure of the courts to apply literally this implement-
ing act in the field of interstate recognition of money judg-
ments, and equitable decrees other than divorce decrees. 121
The consensus of opinion would seem to be that Congress
could do much by further legislation to simplify the prob-
lem of inter-state enforcement in those fields and to clarify
the complications that have been raised by judicial con-
struction. But, little seems to have been said specifically
of the power of Congress in the divorce field.122. The rea-
soning applicable to the direct execution of a money judg-
ment, or even of an equitable decree for money or for
specific performance, would not carry over so readily to
the doubtful matters here discussed which may still cause
uncertainty, or which have caused uncertainty in the past
with reference to divorce decrees. What, if any, power lies
here?
Perhaps it is safer to wait with Mr. Justice Frankfurter
for Congress to interpret its powers before attempting to
speculate in detail what they might be. There is an old
maxim about fools and angels that comes to mind as a
warning. Also, the probability is slight that Congress is
:L2 28 U. S. C. A. (1928) Sec. 687.
121 Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
(1919) 28 Yale L. J. 421; CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1942) 90-107; Corwin, The Full Faith and Credit Clause
(1933) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 371; Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal
System (1936) 20 Minn. L. Rev. 140.
122 The only references found were those of Ross, supra, n. 121, and of
COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942) 98
et seq., 467-8, concerning whether Congress could provide for the service
and execution of state process in other states. Professor Cook argues,
Ibid, 467-8, that provision for such extra-state service and execution would
ameliorate some of the present difficulties of interstate divorce.
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going to spend much thought on interstate divorce in the
perilous times that witness the appearance of this article.
12 a
However, the authors do feel that to the extent to which
the compulsory recognition of a divorce granted in one
state, intrudes into the right of the recognizing state to set
its own domestic relations policy for its own domiciliaries,
any congressional action in the field would have to run
the gauntlet of Tenth Amendment scrutiny. 12' The full
faith and credit clause enabling phrase would not be so
likely to be construed as giving Congress carte-blanche to
establish a uniform domestic relations policy for the nation.
This much would seem to be safe statement with a Su-
preme Court which has already so repeatedly emphasized
its close attention to any legislation that goes beyond the
appropriate spheres of action of any of the various parts
of our federalism. 24
XIII.
CONCLUSION
Turning away from speculation about the future to
return to the case under review, the fact remains that the
total effect of the decision in the Williams and Hendrix
case is merely to compel full faith and credit for that small
group of separate domicil divorces which, up to then under
the Haddock compromise, were entitled only to local valid-
ity and voluntary foreign recognition by comity, because
of lack of defendant's domicil or last marital domicil or
service within the state or appearance in the case. As far
as the actual decision goes, all those divorces which were
good nowhere continue to be good nowhere, and all those
which were good everywhere continue to be so.'
122a On January 21, 1943, Senator Arthur Capper, of Kansas, long an
advocate of Federal control over marriage and divorce, introduced into
Congress a proposed constitutional amendment providing for this. The
proposal covers marriage, divorce, and custody of children affected by
divorce or annulment.
112 U. S. Const., Amendment X: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people."
124 Nothing can be found in the expressed powers of Congress in Art. 1,
Sec. 8 of the Constitution suggesting such a right to clarify the rules of
divorce jurisdiction in any particular State. Quaere as to whether any
argument could be built up under the 14th Amendment, Sec. 5?
L25 I. e., as far as the decision in the principal case goes. See supra, circa
n. 84, et seq.; and supra, circa n..94, et seq., for speculation as to whether
this will continue to be so.
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As a result now, when other states wish to reject sister
state divorces, they must do so on a specific finding either
of lack of procedural due process'26 or that neither of the
spouses was bona fide domiciled in the granting state.127
No longer can those issues be dodged by finding mere ab-
sence of personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defend-
ant spouse. The Walker case continues to be good law
in Maryland, but now it is the only law in Maryland on
the subject. There is no longer a problem of whether and
how we shall exercise the (now defunct) Haddock option.
The Williams and Hendrix case has validated very few,
if any, "tourist divorces," because almost all of them are
granted on the basis of mere colorable domicil which can-
not withstand collateral attack in the courts of other states,
and which, for that matter, may probably be unenforceable
where rendered, as the law now stands.'28
What the case has done is to validate completely those
divorces secured at the unquestionable domicil of the plain-
tiff where it was not possible to obtain personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant. Those divorces, heretofore undei
the Haddock case, might have been rejected by other states
under local rules primarily motivated by fear of the much
less worthy "tourist divorces". Even here, because the
majority of the states which had faced the question had
ruled in favor of voluntary recognition of such divorces,' 29
the decision in its immediate effect is limited to a few
jurisdictions which, like New York and North Carolina,
chose to rely on the Haddock case as a basis for denying
recognition.
But, in ruling unlawful the actions of such states, the
opinion stimulates anew speculation on the other prob-
lems which have been surveyed here, which problems are
needful of further solution by the Court if uncertainty
about divorces shall reach the irreducible minimum.
120 See supra, circa n. 53, et 8eq., for treatment of this.
121 See supra, circa n. 71, et seq., for treatment of this.
121 See supra, circa n. 84, et seq., for treatment about this.
129 See supra, n. 34 for some mention of certain of the state rules about
the exercise of comity.
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